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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brett J. Jacobson appeals from the district court's order reversing the 
magistrate court's dismissal of misdemeanor charges of driving under the 
influence, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After a traffic stop, Jacobson was arrested for misdemeanor driving under 
the influence, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.7-11.) On June 28, 2010, Jacobson was arraigned and 
pleaded not guilty to all three charges. (R., pp.14-16.) He was released on his 
own recognizance the same day with standard release conditions. (R., p.17.) 
Jacobson's counsel entered a notice of appearance, speedy trial demand, 
and demand for sworn complaint on July 9, 2010. (R., pp.18-20.) The state filed 
a sworn criminal complaint on August 2, 2010. (R., pp.32-34.) Responding to 
the complaint, Jacobson entered a second notice of appearance, not guilty plea, 
and speedy trial demand on August 13, 2010. (R., pp.49-51.) Jacobson also 
filed a motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop. (R., pp.52-81.) On 
September 24, 2010, while the suppression motion was pending, the magistrate 
court scheduled a jury trial for January 14, 2011 - six months and 17 days after 
Jacobson first pleaded not guilty to the charges. (R., p.84.) On October 4,2010, 
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after a hearing, the magistrate court denied Jacobson's motion to suppress. (R., 
p.89.) 
On January 4, 2011, six months and seven days after he first pleaded not 
guilty to the charges, and 10 days before the scheduled jury trial, Jacobson filed 
a motion to dismiss, contending that his speedy trial rights under the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions, and I.C. § 19-3501 (4), had been violated. (R., 
pp.90-110.) The magistrate court granted the motion and dismissed the charges. 
(R., pp.111-112.) The state appealed the dismissal to the district court. (R., 
pp.113-115.) In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court concluded 
that Jacobson's speedy trial rights had not been violated, and reversed the 
magistrate court's dismissal of the charges. (R., pp.181-194.) 
Jacobson timely appealed. (R., pp.197-203); see I.A.R. 11 (c)(1 0). The 
magistrate court stayed the criminal case pending the outcome of the appeal. 
(R., p.211.) 
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ISSUE 
states the issue on appeal as: 
Did Judge Watkins commit legal error in his application of I.C. § 19-3501 
to the facts of this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Jacobson failed to show that the district court erred in reversing the 
magistrate court's dismissal order and reinstating the criminal charges? 
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ARGUMENT 
Jacobson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Reversing The 
Magistrate Court's Dismissal Order And Reinstating The Criminal Charges 
A. Introduction 
Jacobson contends that the district court erred in reversing the magistrate 
court's dismissal of the charges against him. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
Specifically, Jacobson contends that the district court erred in concluding that his 
statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. (.!sl) However, the record reveals 
that the district court considered the proper factors in evaluating Jacobson's 
speedy trial claim, and correctly reversed the magistrate court and reinstated the 
criminal charges. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the 
district court properly applied the law to the facts the appellate court will affirm 
the district court's order. See id. (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )). 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's statutory right to a 
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255,257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The appellate court defers to the trial court's 
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but 
freely reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. kt 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Jacobson's Speedy Trial 
Rights Were Not Violated 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a 
speedy triaL" State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 
2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and 
federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); Lopez, 
144 Idaho at 352,160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853,153 P.3d 
1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of 
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her 
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 
407 U.S. at 530. 
Idaho Code § 19-3501 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the 
United States and Idaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within 
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. Clark, 135 Idaho at 257, 16 
P.3d at 933. Specifically, I.C. § 19-3501 (4), the portion of the statute relevant to 
this case, provides: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following 
cases: 
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(4) If a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor 
offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his 
application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months 
from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not 
guilty with the court. 
For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is a sUbstantial 
reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 135 Idaho at 
260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 P.2d 557, 
559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 1115, 1117 
(Ct. App. 1987)); accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 949, 952 
(2001 ). 
In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that whether a "good 
cause" determination under I.C. § 19-3501 contemplates an analysis of the 
constitutional speedy trial factors enunciated in Barker "has been a point of 
contention in this Court for a number of years." Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 803 
P.2d at 934. The Court clarified that a good cause determination under I.C. § 19-
3501 may take into account the factors listed in Barker to the extent that they 
bear on the sufficiency of the good cause itself. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 803 
P.2d at 936 (citing State v. Peterson, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980)). Thus, 
to the extent the Barker factors bear on, or are relevant to, the sufficiency of the 
cause for a trial delay, a court may still conduct an appropriate balancing test 
utilizing those factors. For example, to the extent a trial delay is short, or a 
defendant cannot show prejudice from a delay, or if the defendant has not 
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asserted his right to a speedy trial, a weaker reason will constitute "good cause." 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,803 P.2d 936 (quoting Peterson, 288 N.W.2d at 335). 
Since Clark, the idaho Court of Appeals has utilized each of the Barker 
factors in making "good cause" determinations pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501. See 
~ State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 10-11,27 P.3d 417,419-320 (Ct. App. 
2001); State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 549-550, 211 P.3d 792, 794-795 (Ct. App. 
2009); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 899-903, 231 P.3d 532, 544-548 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
Thus, there is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to 
delay a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial 
court. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 
16 P.3d at 936). Ultimately, "whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter 
for judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Clark, 
135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936 (citing Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 
559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at 1117). The trial court's discretion is 
not unbridled, however, and its decision is subject to independent review on 
appeal. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 
16 P.3d at 936). 
In this case, it is undisputed that the jury trial was set for January 14, 
2011, due to a magistrate court ISTARS data entry error. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-
4; R., pp.183, 219.) The ISTARS system generates a speedy trial-compliant jury 
trial date based on the date of a defendant's not guilty plea. (R., pp.183, 219.) 
However, in this instance, instead of entering the date of Jacobson's June 28, 
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2010 initial not-guilty plea, the magistrate court entered dates associated with the 
August 2, 2010 sworn complaint and/or August 13, 2010 second not-guilty plea. 
(R., pp.183, 219.) This caused a trial setting 17 days outside of the I.C. § 19-
3501 6-month speedy trial period. (Id.) 
The district court properly analyzed this delay. This type of delay, a data 
entry error, is a "neutral" reason for delay in a constitutional speedy trial analysis, 
i.e., unlike a bad-faith delay caused by the state, it should not be heavily weighed 
against the state in determining whether the defendant's speedy trial rights were 
violated. See Moore, 148 Idaho at 900, 231 P.3d 532 at 545 ("neutral reason[s], 
such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed less heavily but 
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the state rather than with the defendant"); see also 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 89, 844 P.2d 712, 718 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 
2005.) In a statutory speedy trial analysis, such a "neutral reason," is at worst, a 
"weaker reason" such that would require the state to show a relatively shorter 
trial delay, less assertive or absent speedy trial right demand, and a lack of 
prejudice from the trial delay in order for the reason for the delay to constitute 
"good cause." See Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 803 P.2d at 936 (quoting Peterson, 
288 N.W.2d at 335); Hernandez, 136 Idaho at 11, 27 P.3d at 420. 
In this case, the district court considered the Barker factors, and properly 
concluded that the trial delay did not violate Jacobson's speedy trial rights. (R., 
pp.182-189.) The district court correctly found that the approximately two and 
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one-half week jury trial delay was "insignificant," and that Jacobson had not 
shown any prejudice from the brief 
was released on his own recognizance 
(R., pp.187-189) Indeed, Jacobson 
day he was arraigned, and there is no 
indication in the record that he was ever subsequently jailed on the charges. 
(See R., pp.16-17.) Jacobson has not asserted any other specific prejudice from 
the short delay, such as significant anxiety or impairment of defense, either 
below or on appeal, and no such specific prejudice is apparent from the record. 
The state agrees with the district court's conclusion that Jacobson did not 
waive his speedy trial rights by failing to object to the late jury trial setting during 
the three months between when the trial date was set and when the six-month 
period expired. (R., pp.187-188). However, in a Barker factor balancing test, 
Jacobson's failure to object to the late trial setting, despite an opportunity to do 
so, should cause his previous speedy trial right assertion to be weighed less 
heavily against the state than if Jacobson had objected and had his request to 
schedule the trial for an earlier date been denied. 
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court found it "important" to the 
constitutional speedy trial balancing test conducted in that case that "the record 
strongly sugest[ed] that while [the defendant] hoped to take advantage of the 
delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, 
he definitely did not want to be tried." Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-535; see also 
Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171; Moore, 148 Idaho at 902-903, 231 
P.3d at 547-548; Livas, 147 Idaho at 550, 211 P.3d at 795 (considering, in the 
context of a statutory speedy trial analysis, that "[a]fter Livas' initial not guilty 
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plea and demand for a jury trial, Livas did not object to the court's scheduling or 
point out any possible problem with the pace of the case"). Similarly, the record 
in this case suggests that Jacobson never requested a more expeditious trial 
setting, was complicit in the trial delay, and possibly did not desire a speedy trial. 
Jacobson's initial assertion of his speedy trial rights was thus weakened for 
purposes of an I.C. § 19-3501 (4) analysis utilizing Barker factors. 
In this case, the Barker factors do bear on and are relevant to the 
sufficiency of the reason for the jury trial delay. The clerical error created only a 
brief, non-prejudicial delay. Further, the nature of the data entry error, which was 
apparently undetected by the court and state until Jacobson made his motion to 
dismiss, permitted Jacobson to attempt to capitalize on the oversight by delaying 
any reassertion of his speedy trial rights until after the six-month period expired. 
Viewed outside a vacuum, the magistrate court's data entry error, 
considered in conjunction with the short delay, lack of prejudice, and Jacobson's 
delayed re-assertion of his speedy trial rights constituted "good cause" for the 
trial delay. The district court therefore did not err in reversing the magistrate 
court's dismissal and reinstating the misdemeanor DUl, possession of a 
controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia charges. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this affirm the district court's 
order reversing the magistrate's court's dismissal 
DATED this 6th day of February 2012 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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